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continental divide:  
heidegger, cassirer, davos 
by peter e. gordon. cambridge, 
mA: harvard university press, 
2010. pp. 448. $39.95 cloth.
the public debate that took place 
between ernst cassirer (1874–1945) 
and martin heidegger (1889–1976) 
in the spring of 1929 at the second 
annual internationale davoser 
hochschulkurse in davos, switzer-
land, is remembered by scholars of 
twentieth-century culture not only 
for the light that it sheds on these 
figures’ opposed philosophical po-
sitions but also as an indication of 
the path that european philoso-
phy—and, more controversially, 
european politics—would follow 
in the years to come. cassirer, an 
assimilated Jew and staunch sup-
porter of the Weimar republic, 
had studied under the neo-Kan-
tian hermann cohen and made a 
name for himself both as an histo-
rian of philosophy and as a formi-
dable philosopher of science. the 
younger heidegger, whose Being 
and time had been published a few 
years earlier (1927), had broken 
from the transcendental phenom-
enology of his mentor, edmund 
husserl, and was now viewed as a 
representative of the “new philoso-
phy,” as a champion of life and the 
irrational opposed to attempts to 
codify philosophy as a rigorous sci-
ence. A few years after the debate, 
concurrent with the rise of Na-
zism, cassirer would leave his post 
in hamburg and move to england, 
then sweden, before settling in the 
united states. heidegger, to whom 
hindsight has tended to award vic-
tory in the debate, would assume 
the rectorship at the university of 
Freiburg (though he would resign 
just a year later) and join the Nazi 
party. Both philosophers would 
remain productive into their final 
years, though with time the incom-
mensurability of their respective 
positions would only become more 
pronounced. 
in his exciting new study, conti-
nental divide: heidegger, cassirer, 
davos, the intellectual historian 
peter e. gordon attempts to sepa-
rate the philosophical kernel of the 
davos debate—ostensibly, the cor-
rect interpretation of immanuel 
Kant’s critical philosophy—from 
its political shell. indeed, gordon’s 
claim that what occurred between 
cassirer and heidegger was above 
all a philosophical conversation 
ought to be read as a challenge to 
the more politically charged analy-
ses of the same event developed by, 
among others, hans Blumenberg, 
pierre Bourdieu, and geoff Waite. 
this is not to say that politics plays 
no role in continental divide. gor-
don is quick to admit that the af-
terlife of the davos debate has been 
decidedly extraphilosophical. But, 
he notes, the danger of an allegori-
cal interpretation of this event is 
that “by dissolving the philosophi-
cal into the political, it threatens to 
divest us of any remaining criteria 
by which to decide intellectual de-
bate other than the anti-intellec-
tual contingencies of sheer power” 
(357). By reducing philosophy to 
politics, gordon avers, we sacrifice 
the ability to ground our political 
choices in anything other than 
force. his opposed strategy is to lo-
cate the exchange between cassirer 
and heidegger in an intellectual-
historical force field that includes 
neo-Kantianism and phenomenol-
ogy, existentialism and vitalism, all 
the while stressing that the heart 
of the debate remained a clash be-
tween two incompatible readings of 
Kant’s project. When cassirer and 
heidegger’s respective positions are 
grasped on their own terms, as well 
as in relation to the wider situation 
of Weimar-era philosophy, gordon 
wagers, we will finally begin to un-
derstand why a relatively special-
ized discussion came to be treated 
as a critical juncture in both the 
intra- and the extraphilosophical 
culture of europe. 
in the first chapter of the book, 
gordon provides a summary anal-
ysis of the intellectual climate dur-
ing the years of the Weimar repub-
lic. though the title of this chapter, 
“philosophy in crisis,” points syn-
echdocally to the wider transfor-
mations occurring in germany at 
the time, the core of the crisis that 
gordon describes is the usurpation 
of neo-Kantianism as continental 
europe’s dominant philosophy. in 
brief, neo-Kantianism, especially 
in the form given to it by the mar-
burg school philosopher hermann 
cohen, sought to downplay the 
metaphysical dimension of Kant’s 
work in favor of the epistemo-
logical dimension. the result of 
this endeavor was a reconfigured 
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Kantianism qua logic of scientific 
knowledge, for which the more 
mysterious dimensions of Kant’s 
project—the pure spatiotemporal 
forms of intuition, as well as the 
thing-in-itself—were either re-
duced to logical operations or elim-
inated altogether. though cassirer 
retained the essentially neo-Kan-
tian faith in human consciousness 
as a spontaneous faculty that “con-
stituted and animated” the world 
of experience (86), gordon writes, 
he nonetheless “modified the basic 
character of neo-Kantianism al-
most to the breaking point” (84), 
moving from the analysis of natural 
science to the symbolic operations 
basic to human culture. heidegger, 
too, came of age in the milieu of 
neo-Kantianism, and though his 
reading of the critique of Pure 
reason (1781) was diametrically 
opposed to the reading set forth by 
the neo-Kantians, he continued to 
associate himself with Kant’s proj-
ect. Where cohen and, after him, 
cassirer looked to Kant’s philoso-
phy as a means of setting science (in 
the broader german sense of Wis-
senschaft) on a secure intellectual 
ground, heidegger read Kant as a 
metaphysician, as a heideggerian 
ontologist avant la lettre whose 
project reached its apogee in a radi-
cal thinking of human finitude. 
gordon’s rejection of politi-
cal interpretation and his transla-
tion of the respective positions of 
cassirer and heidegger into the 
common language of Kantianism 
dovetails suggestively with the 
professed aim of the davos hoch-
schule during its four years of ex-
istence (1928–31): to heal through 
philosophical conversation the 
political wounds inflicted by the 
great War. As gordon notes in 
the second chapter, “setting the 
stage,” the standing of the hoch-
schule was secured already in its 
first year, when it counted among 
its guests Albert einstein, who 
both lectured on the theory of 
relativity and performed on the 
violin. in 1929, the theme of the 
conference, Was ist der mensch? 
(What is the human being?), was 
intended as general enough to be 
open to a variety of philosophi-
cal approaches while still gestur-
ing more or less explicitly to the 
work of Kant (who had suggested 
in his Jäsche Logic (1800) that the 
central questions of critical phi-
losophy come together in the “an-
thropological” question “What 
is man?”). it succeeded in its cos-
mopolitan mission insofar as it 
welcomed not just heidegger and 
cassirer but future greats such as 
Ludwig Binswanger, Jean cavail-
lès, eugen Fink, maurice de gan-
dillac, emmanuel Lévinas, and 
Joachim ritter. 
chapters 3 and 4 of continental 
divide culminate in a retranslation 
of the debate in its entirety, supple-
mented by gordon’s copious ex-
planatory notes. though gordon 
takes the opportunity to reaffirm 
that the debate hinged on opposed 
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readings of Kant’s project in terms 
of either spontaneity (cassirer) or 
finitude/thrownness (heidegger), 
he also acknowledges that it soon 
became clear that “the Kant inter-
pretation heidegger presented at 
davos served as merely a pretext 
for expounding his own philoso-
phy” (161). it is with this in mind 
that we might read the intervention 
in the debate by the dutch linguist 
hendrik pos, an audience mem-
ber sympathetic to cassirer’s proj-
ect and the only figure other than 
cassirer and heidegger to speak. 
“Both men speak a completely dif-
ferent language,” pos observed, and 
“it is a matter of extracting some-
thing common from these two lan-
guages” (189). the establishment of 
a common language seems to have 
been a hope shared by cassirer, 
as well as by the organizers of the 
hochschule, and, as i’ve already 
noted, it is also more or less explic-
itly gordon’s aim in continental 
divide. For heidegger, however, 
who would later reflect on the on-
tological significance of polemos, a 
common language seems to have 
been less important. in fact, near 
the end of the debate, heidegger 
stated straightforwardly that “what 
i describe by dasein does not allow 
translation into a concept of cas-
sirer’s” (195). it is worth noting 
this issue of translatability because, 
despite gordon’s very evenhanded 
treatment of cassirer’s and hei-
degger’s respective positions, the 
viability of continental divide’s 
method hinges on the availability 
of something like the common lan-
guage projected by cassirer, pos, 
and the organizers of the hoch-
schule. We will return to this point 
in a moment. 
the end of the debate takes us 
only a little beyond the midpoint 
of continental divide. gordon 
uses the second half of the book to 
“break from history and . . . pause 
to consider some of the deeper and 
conceptual issues at stake in the 
debate” (215). this interruption 
allows him to treat the positions 
of the participants in greater detail 
and, most interestingly, to interpret 
cassirer’s and heidegger’s post-
davos writings in light of some of 
the issues that arose in 1929. For 
example, gordon quite convinc-
ingly reads some of cassirer’s late 
texts, the much-celebrated Philoso-
phy of enlightenment (1932) and 
the posthumously published myth 
of the state (1946), as two defenses 
of rationality against the perceived 
irrationalism embodied by hei-
degger. in the latter text, written 
during his brief term in the phi-
losophy department at columbia, 
cassirer finally took the opportu-
nity to reflect on the specifically 
political significance of heidegger’s 
project, ultimately condemning it 
as a symptom of “the return of fa-
talism in our modern world” (310). 
heidegger, on the other hand, 
never really took the time to en-
gage with cassirer’s thought after 
their davos encounter; his further 
philosophical studies led him out of 
cassirer’s ambit, backward in time 
before Kant to the pre-socratics. A 
real dialogue with cassirer became 
impossible. 
in the last chapter of continen-
tal divide, on “philosophy and 
memory,” gordon interrogates the 
reappearance of the davos debate 
in contemporary thought, not as a 
philosophical conversation but as a 
cultural-political allegory. in alle-
gorical renderings of the encounter 
between cassirer and heidegger, 
the smallest details take on grand 
significance. gordon thus dedicates 
a brief section to pos’s recollection 
that, at the end of the debate, hei-
degger refused to shake cassirer’s 
hand. if it happened, this slight 
would have at least indicated hei-
degger’s lack of manners. more 
seriously, it could also substantiate 
charges of anti-semitism. No one 
but pos claims to have witnessed 
this incident, and gordon is rightly 
skeptical that it ever happened. 
Nonetheless, in a 1945 discussion 
of the debate, heidegger remarked 
that “he had not hesitated ‘to shake 
publicly the hand of the Jew cas-
sirer’” (340). heidegger’s question-
able defense of his behavior sug-
gests that the disputed handshake 
was, at any rate, on his mind. 
gordon leaves the question of the 
handshake unresolved, letting it 
stand as evidence of the weight ret-
roactively afforded to each of the 
debate’s (non)events. 
in the last pages of his study, 
gordon makes some of his most 
contentious claims about the rela-
tionship of politics to philosophy, 
writing that “the ultimate tragedy 
of the davos encounter is not that 
it ended in victory for politics of 
the wrong kind. the deeper trag-
edy is that it ended in politics at all” 
(357). obviously, this remark war-
rants further reflection. gordon’s 
claim, as i noted earlier, is that the 
reduction of philosophical disputes 
to their political subtexts results in 
the sacrifice of rational standards 
for adjudicating these disputes. in 
the absence of these standards, la 
force fait loi. And yet, gordon’s 
turn to a philosophical metalan-
guage—in this case, the language 
of  Kantianism—as a response to 
the threat of a political overreading 
is not entirely satisfying. indeed, 
gordon’s need to demonstrate 
that a philosophical conversation 
(rather than a political struggle) 
took place at davos occasionally 
results in a somewhat narrow read-
ing of heidegger in particular. the 
latter becomes more of a Kantian 
(and, thus, less of a husserlian, 
diltheyan, Kierke gaardian, or 
Aristotelian) than he really was so 
as to appear closer to the Kantian 
cassirer. is it possible, one might 
wonder, to accept that the core of 
the davos debate was philosophi-
cal while denying that cassirer and 
heidegger were ever speaking the 
same language? A larger question 
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is whether belief in the autonomy 
of philosophy vis-à-vis politics nec-
essarily entails the belief that all 
philosophical disputes can be, phil-
osophically, resolved. 
No doubt such questions are 
bound to arise in any attempt to 
deal with the work of a figure so 
controversial as heidegger, and 
gordon’s book has much to recom-
mend it. in addition to wonderfully 
clear treatments of cassirer’s and 
heidegger’s philosophies, particu-
larly as they dovetail with Kantian-
ism, continental divide is packed 
with anecdotes, which range from 
heidegger’s high opinion of his 
own abilities as a skier to emman-
uel Lévinas’s guilty recollection of 
his mocking portrayal of cassirer 
in a comical restaging of the debate. 
perhaps these small flourishes in-
terest gordon less than the funda-
mental questions of philosophy, but 
they make his book not only infor-
mative but a pleasure to read. 
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